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Agreement was reached by the EU member 
states in June 2007 to remove the competition 
phrase contained in Article 3(1)(g) of the EC 
Treaty
1 from the new Reform Treaty 
(hereafter referred to as the competition 
principle) and create a ‘competition 
protocol’
2 that includes the words from Article 3(1)(g). 
This paper argues such treatment of the matter is 
inadequate to protect the current competition acquis and 
ensure the healthy future development of Community 
competition law.  
                                                 
1 The provision of “a system ensuring that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted”. 
2 In the Presidency Conclusions the text of the protocol is set out 
as “The High Contracting Parties considering that the internal 
market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union 
includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted”. 
The protocol then goes on to provide that “The Union shall, if 
necessary, take action under the provisions of the Treaties, 
including under Article 308 of the Treaty of the Functioning of 
the Union”. Article 308 currently provides “If action by the 
Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, take the appropriate measures”. It is understood that 
no substantive changes are planned for Article 308 in the Reform 
Treaty. It should also be noted that the protocol is likely to be 
subject to some amendment. See the latest version from the draft 
Council Treaty negotiating document, which suggests the 
following text: “THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
CONSIDERING that the internal market as set out in Article [I-
3] of the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring 
that competition is not distorted, HAVE AGREED UPON the 
following provision, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Union: [Sole Article] For the purposes of the first recital, the 
Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions of the 
Treaties, including under Article [308] of the Treaty on the 




Far from being a minor technical adjustment, this 
paper argues that the excision of the competition 
principle from the front of the Treaty is likely to have a 
number of damaging consequences for EC competition 
law. There is a real danger that in future EC 
competition law will be cribbed, crabbed and confined. 
While price-fixers may still be fined and dominant 
firms such as Microsoft put under the investigatory 
microscope, the power of the State to distort 
competition through subsidy and regulation will 
increase. There are also serious concerns as to the 
extent to which the excision of the competition 
principle will be deployed to assist industrial policy 
arguments in merger control cases and frustrate the 
liberalisation of hitherto protected industrial sectors.
3 
The paper is divided into four parts. Section 2 
considers whether a protocol is sufficient to protect the 
current competition acquis; section 3 considers the 
likely consequences if Article 3(1)(g) is not restored 
and the final section offers a conclusion. 
2. Is a protocol enough to protect 
competition?  
In a letter of 27 June 2007 to the Financial Times, Mr 
Michel Petite, the Director General of the European 
Commission’s Legal Service, rejected the arguments 
of FT columnist Wolfgang Munchau that the removal 
of the competition principle from the Reform Treaty 
threatened the status of competition in the single 
market. (Petite’s letter is worth quoting in full – see 
box on next page.)  
                                                 
3 See Jonathan Galloway, “The Pursuit of National 
Champions: The Intersection of Competition Law and 
Industrial Policy”, European Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, 
2007, pp. 172-186. 
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Petite argued firstly that the competition principle 
enunciated in Article 3(1)(g) has never been an 
objective in Community Law. The competition 
principle had only ever appeared as an objective in the 
failed EU Constitution. Since it has never been an 
objective in the EC Treaty, its non-appearance as an 
objective in the Reform Treaty does not impact the 
status of competition in the Community legal order. He 
then goes on to argue that as a protocol is legally 
binding in Community law, the ‘competition protocol’ 
has the effect of protecting the status of competition 
law.  
Text of letter to the editor of the FT from Michel Petite 
Sir, Wolfgang Munchau ("The madness of Europe's drift 
to mercantilism", June 25) seems to be worried by the 
removal of an explicit reference to free and undistorted 
competition from the provision in the future ‘Reform 
Treaty’ listing the policy objectives of the European 
Union and has doubts as to the legal implications of the 
protocol that the European Council has proposed in its 
place. As a matter of fact, competition is not currently 
one of the objectives of the European Community set out 
in Article 2 of the EC Treaty: the reference to 
“undistorted competition” appears only in Article 3 on 
the Community activities to be implemented to attain 
those objectives. Clearly, an objective that does not exist 
cannot be lost! The fact that competition is a means and 
not an objective of the Community has not – over the past 
50 years or so – prevented the European institutions, and 
in particular the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice, from taking effective action against any 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market, whether resulting from initiatives taken by 
undertakings or by member states’ public authorities. The 
text of the ‘Constitutional Treaty’ provided for a 
substantial reworking of the above provisions, with an 
explicit reference to “free and undistorted competition” 
linked to the ‘internal market’ objective. The principal 
effect of dropping those words from the future ‘Reform 
Treaty’ is to bring us back to the present situation. To 
avoid any risk of uncertainty as to settled law and to 
make fully clear that competition will continue to be one 
of the main policies aiming at the good functioning of the 
internal market, the European Council decided to provide 
for the protocol referred to by Mr Munchau, which 
paraphrases the current EC Treaty provisions. It is also 
worth recalling that, from a legal point of view, a 
protocol forms an integral part of the Treaty to which it is 
annexed and has the same legal value as Treaty 
provisions. That is why I do not share Mr Munchau's 
legal concerns on this issue. 
Source: Financial Times, 27 June 2007. 
This letter is disingenuous in the extreme. What it 
seeks to glide over is the fact that the EC Treaty 
Article 3(1)(g) listed competition as an activity of the 
Community and that no similar provision will exist in 
the preamble or first few articles of the Treaty under 
the new Treaty regime. 
Petite argued that this is not important because of the 
legally binding nature of a protocol in Community law. 
Accordingly, the status of competition law would be 
maintained in the Reform Treaty. While it is correct to 
say that a protocol is legally binding, his argument 
does not take account of the way the European Court 
of Justice looks to the objective and purposes of the 
Treaty from the preamble and the first few articles to 
interpret substantive Treaty provisions.  
What is overlooked in Petite’s analysis is that the 
preamble and the first few ‘principle’ articles are 
always going to have a tremendously important impact 
on the Court. First, the ECJ is going to take account of 
Articles 31(1)
4 and 33(4)
5 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties which emphasise the 
importance of the objective and purpose of the Treaties 
as a guide to interpretation. Second, as a result of the 
existence of 19 technically equally authentic language 
versions of the Treaties the Court has little alternative 
but to take an object and purpose approach. The third 
factor is the development of a strong Community law 
sui generis purposive interpretation tradition. This 
tradition seeks to deal with major questions of scope 
and conflicts of values by consideration of the 
objectives and purposes of the Treaties as set out in the 
preamble and the first few articles of the Treaties. In 
the EC Treaty this means the preamble, Articles 2 and 
3 and certain other articles of principle such as Articles 
10 on co-operation and Article 13 on discrimination. 
No mere protocol can achieve the same interpretative 
status as the preamble and the first few articles. Any 
close examination of the case law demonstrates the 
fundamental nature of Article 3(1)(g) in making 
competition an objective of the Community legal 
order, most notably in Continental Can
6 where the 
Court ruled that ‘If Article 3(f) [now Article 3(1)(g) ]
7 
provides for the institution of a system ensuring that 
competition in the Common Market is not distorted, 
then it requires a fortiori that competition must not be 
eliminated.  This requirement is so essential that 
without it numerous provisions of the Treaty would be 
pointless.[authors italics]’.
8  
                                                 
4 “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.” 
5 “When a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a 
difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 
and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles 
the texts, having regard to the objects and purpose of the 
treaty, shall be adopted.”  
6 Case 6/72 [1973] ECR 215. 
7 The provision moved from Article 3(f) at Maastricht 
becoming Article 3(g). At Amsterdam it became Article 
3(1)(g). 
8 Op. cit., para 24.  
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This view has been echoed in more recent cases, for 
example, in Courage Limited v. Crehan
9 the Court was 
clear as to the effect Article 3(1)(g) had on Article 
81(then Article 85): 
According to Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty (now, 
after amendment, Article 3(1)(g) EC), Article 85 
of the Treaty constitutes a fundamental provision 
which is essential for the accomplishment of the 
tasks entrusted to the Community and, in 
particular, for the functioning of the internal 
market.
10  
At the very least it is open to question how easy it is 
going to be for a protocol tacked on to the back of the 
Treaty to maintain the status of Article 81 (and Article 
82) as a ‘fundamental provision’. The Crehan  case 
concerned a challenge to the English rule that a party 
to a contract which it alleged to be unlawful was 
barred from subsequently bringing an action for 
damages based upon that same contract. The Court 
took the view that the absolute bar to action was 
unjustified and such factors as the relative bargaining 
power of the parties and their conduct should be taken 
into account in permitting an action for damages to 
proceed.
11 Without Article 3(1)(g) setting out the 
interpretative object and making Article 81 a 
‘fundamental provision’ will the Court be able to take 
such a broad approach to the application of the 
competition rules based on a protocol in the future? 
Perhaps even more disturbing is the discussion of the 
conflict of objectives in Albany International.
12 Albany 
concerned the status of a state measure imposing 
compulsory charges to a pension fund. The key issue 
in that case was the way the Court recognised that two 
conflicting Community objectives were in play.  
…..It is important to bear in mind that, under 
Article 3(g) and (i) of the EC Treaty (now, after 
amendment, Article 3(1)(g) and (j) EC), the 
activities of the Community are to include not 
only a ‘system ensuring that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted’ but also ‘a policy 
in the social sphere’. Article 2 of the EC Treaty 
(now, after amendment, Article 2 EC) provides 
that a particular task of the Community is ‘to 
promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities’ and ‘a high level of 
employment and of social protection’.
13 
What happens when competition is no longer an 
objective in one of the key first few interpretative 
articles of the Treaty and the competition objective has 
                                                 
9 Case C-453/99 [2001] ECR I-6297. 
10 Ibid., para 20. 
11 Op. cit., para 22. 
12 C-67/96 [1999] ECR I-5751. 
13 Ibid., para 54. 
to be balanced against social objectives that are in one 
of the key interpretative articles? How likely is it that 
the Court will balance the competition protocol with 
the same weight as one of the social objectives set out 
at the front of the Treaty? 
The broad influence of Article 3(1)(g) can also be seen 
in the debate on the development of Article 82 in 
British Airways v. Commission:
14  
The starting-point here must be the protective 
purpose of Article 82 EC. The provision forms 
part of a system designed to protect competition 
within the internal market from distortions 
(Article 3(1)(g) EC). Accordingly, Article 82 
EC, like the other competition rules of the 
Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to 
protect the immediate interests of individual 
competitors or consumers, but to protect the 
structure of the market and thus competition as 
such (as an institution), which has already been 
weakened by the presence of the dominant 
undertaking on the market. In this way, 
consumers are also indirectly protected. Because 
where competition as such is damaged, 
disadvantages for consumers are also to be 
feared.
15 
It is possible that here however the French government 
and its Commission supporters may find that excising 
Article 3(1)(g) from the front of the Treaty has a 
significant downside. If Article 3(1)(g) is excised then 
it would make it easier for the proponents of a more 
economically liberal approach to Article 82 to argue 
that there is less need to protect the structure of the 
market and permit instead a greater focus on harm to 
consumers and consumer welfare.  
Article 3(1)(g) was also one of the major planks in the 
development of the State Measures cases from Inno v. 
ATAB
16 in 1978 to the recent CIF case
17 which seek to 
restrict the power of the Member States to circumvent 
the competition rules. For example, if a Member State 
seeks to hide an illegal price-fixing cartel under the 
umbrella of state legislation, the ECJ has permitted the 
Commission to challenge such legislation using Article 
3(1)(g) read with Article 10.
18 Does the excision of 
Article 3(1)(g) mean that it will be more difficult for 
                                                 
14 Case C-95/04 P, 15 March 2007, not yet reported. 
15 Ibid., para 68. 
16 Case 13/77 [1977] E.C.R. 2115. 
17 Case C-198/01 [2003] ECR I-8055 
18 See, for example, the Belgian Travel Agents Case 311/85 
ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. ASBL Sociale 
Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke 
Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR 3801.  
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the Commission to challenge such state inspired 
circumvention of the competition rules in the future.
19 
It is also clear that Article 3(1)(g) has been deployed to 
buttress the state aid rules. For example, take the 
approach of the Court of First Instance in Air France v. 
Commission:
20  
Article 92(1) of the Treaty …refers to ‘aid 
granted by the States or through State resources 
`in any form whatsoever'. Consequently, those 
provisions must be interpreted not on the basis of 
formal criteria but rather by reference to their 
purpose, which, according to Article 3(g) of the 
Treaty, is to ensure that competition is not 
distorted. It follows that all subsidies from the 
public sector threatening the play of competition 
are caught by the abovementioned provisions, it 
being unnecessary for those subsidies to be 
granted by the government or by a central 
administrative authority of a Member State (see, 
to that effect, Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission 
[1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 13, and Sloman 
Neptun, cited above, paragraph 19).
21 
It could however be argued that as long as the words of 
the competition principle are found somewhere in the 
Treaty, even in a legally binding protocol, they would 
still have the same interpretative effect.
22 The 
difficulty with this view is that it could only ever 
sustain credibility if one were to argue that the 
preamble and the first few articles of the Treaty did not 
have any special interpretative effect compared with 
                                                 
19 See for instance Barry Rodger (ed.), Article 234 and 
Competition Law: An Analysis, Kluwer, 2007. In particular, 
note in chapter 3 where Rodger points out that state-related 
case law constitutes the majority of competition rulings 
handed down by the ECJ. 
20 Case T-358/94 [1996] ECR II-2109. 
21 Op. cit., para 55 
22 One additional argument that could be made is that the 
reference in the proposed protocol to Article 308 EC which 
does refer to the Community objectives could be deployed 
by the ECJ to deem competition law an objective. For this 
view to prosper, unfortunately, a heroic effort at 
interpretation would be required by the ECJ. Article 308 is 
in essence the ‘any other business’ provision of the Treaty. 
It is difficult to see how the Court can derive such an 
interpretation from Article 308. Furthermore, the text of the 
sentence, while specifically referring to Article 308 makes it 
clear that the Union can take action under “the provisions of 
the Treaties” more generally, which suggests that what the 
authors of the protocol had in mind was to preserve the legal 
base for legislation on competition matters beyond Articles 
81 and 82, for instance in respect of merger control. In fact, 
this second sentence reinforces the view that the excision of 
Article 3(1)(g) from the front of the Treaty has undermined 
the status of competition law. Why otherwise would the 
framers of the protocol have felt it necessary to include the 
second sentence of the protocol to preserve the legal base for 
competition legislation? 
other provisions of the Treaty. It is however clear from 
the text and structure of the preamble and the first few 
articles as well as the case law discussed above that 
they clearly do have significance that is not accorded 
to other Treaty provisions and protocols.  
It is difficult therefore to sustain the argument that the 
excision of Article 3(1)(g) from the front of the Treaty 
will not have a significant negative effect on 
Community competition law. At the very least there 
has to be concern that the power of the Member States 
to distort competition law has been facilitated by the 
removal of Article 3(1)(g). For example, will the CFI 
and the ECJ consider that they can safely uphold the 
existing state measures case law which expressly relies 
upon Article 3(1)(g) to restrict state inspired 
circumvention measures to distort the competition 
rules? Both courts will probably find it difficult to 
maintain the legal position set out in existing case law 
when the competition principle upon which a large part 
of it rests has been removed from the interpretative 
provisions of the Treaty? Clearly the competition 
protocol will be given some weight, but it is very 
difficult to see how it can be given the same weight as 
the interpretative provisions at the front of the Treaty. 
The conclusion therefore is that the competition acquis 
will be weakened by the excision of Article 3(1)(g). 
One person who has little doubt as to the impact of the 
excision of Article 3(1)(g) from the front of the Treaty 
is President Sarkozy. At the June press conference, he 
took the following view of the excision of Article 
3(1)(g): 
We have obtained a major reorientation on the 
objectives of the Union. Competition is no 
longer an objective of the Union or an end in 
itself, but a means to serve the internal market… 
Perhaps even more illuminating is this snapshot taken 
from the Q&A: 
Question: To return to the objectives of the 
EU, on competition and the protection of 
citizens: What do these changes mean exactly 
in the daily life of the French and or the 
Europeans? 
Answer. This perhaps gives a little more 
humanity to Europe. Because as an ideology, 
as dogma, what did competition give to 
Europe? It has given less and less to the people 
who vote at the European elections, and less 
and less to the people who believe in Europe. 
There was perhaps a need to reflect. I believe 
in competition, I believe in markets, but I 
believe in competition as a means and not an 
end in itself. This may also give a different 
legal direction to the Commission. That of a 
competition that is there to support the 
emergence of European champions, to carry 
out a true industrial policy. It was not a  
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question of making an economic Treaty or a 
liberal Treaty and explain it to the citizen. It 
was a question of turning our backs to 
ideology, dogma and naivety.
23 
3. Consequences for competition if the 
proposed reform treaty is not amended 
It is difficult in advance of a finalised Treaty text – 
never mind any case law on the issue – to give a 
comprehensive overview of the impact of the 
relegation of the undistorted competition phrase to a 
protocol. However, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that some member states will be looking to use the 
Reform Treaty to weaken the crucial impact of 
competition law. Three particular lines of attack are 
relatively easy to identify. 
First, to expand the scope for lawful state aid: As the 
Air France case indicates above, Article 3(1)(g) was 
available to reinforce the obligations in respect of state 
aid, to limit any legal formalism and minimise 
justifications for aid. The ECJ could look again at 
cases like Air France restricting the scope of the 
notion of the sources of aid. 
Second, to permit merger clearance on broader 
industrial policy grounds: The scope of EC merger 
control has always been contentious. However, over 
the last decade it has slowly evolved to a much 
stronger consumer welfare standard focusing on direct 
harm to consumers. This development is potentially at 
risk. With the removal of Article 3(1)(g) and the 
existence of social and economic development 
objectives in the new Article 3, there is scope to make 
an argument for a broader industrial policy standard in 
merger clearance.
24 The broadening of the assessment 
standard could also make it easier for member states to 
justify clearance on the basis that the deal would create 
a national or European champion. The development of 
a stronger industrial policy approach to merger 
clearance and support for industrial champions as 
indicated above clearly seems to be one of the aims of 
Sarkozy’s excision of Article 3(1)(g). 
                                                 
23 I am thankful to Dr Giorgio Monti at the LSE who 
extracted these quotes, translated them and put them on his 
blog. The quotes can be found at his blogsite (see 
http://competitionlawboard.blogspot.com/2007/06/more-on-
politics-of-brussels-summit.html). 
24 There is an apparent conflict here between the prospect of 
weakening the structural approach to Article 82 and a 
stronger industrial policy approach to merger control. 
However, it is submitted that this conflict is more apparent 
than real. Once the objective of Article 3(1)(g) is excised 
from the front of the Treaty, there is a greater danger of 
fragmentation. Hence Article 82 may lose the structural 
aspect of its case law whereas the merger control case law 
may take on a stronger industrial policy character.   
Third, to weaken the pressure for market liberalisation, 
particularly in respect of ownership unbundling in the 
energy sector: One major concern here is that the 
Commission’s powers under Article 86(3) of the EC 
Treaty and Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 to order the 
break up of monopolistic infrastructure could be 
circumscribed by the excision of the competition 
principle. At the very least the removal of the 
competition principle is likely to raise concerns in DG 
Competition as to the scope of its powers in Article 
86(3) and Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 to take 
measures such as ordering ownership unbundling 
and/or such parallel measures requiring gas release 
schemes under the Merger Regulation.  
4. Choking competition law 
Many practitioners may take the view that they need 
not be bothered by this development. Leniency 
applications will still be made, merger filings will still 
take place and Article 82 may inadvertently be given a 
more economically radical edge. However, outside 
these core areas, if the competition principle is not 
restored to its position as one of the key interpretative 
articles of the Treaty, the development of competition 
law and the competitiveness of the European Union 
will suffer. The fundamental development of 
competition law into hitherto protected sectors and its 
ability to limit the impact of state interference on the 
competitive process will be compromised. Given the 
size of the state in most member states, this is no small 
matter for European competitiveness and the long-term 
prospects for growth and the economic future of all 
Europeans  
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